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Abstract
A simple model of imitation and innovation is developed to explain a complicated picture
of relative productivity growth in different countries. The model makes difference between
global and local innovations and does not assume that a country always imitates the most
advanced technology. It is shown that there are three types of stationary states, where
only imitation, only innovation or a mixed policy prevails. We demonstrate how one can
find the stationary states and check their stability for a broad class of imitation-innovation
cost functions.
Using World Bank statistical data for the period of 1980-1999, we reveal the depen-
dence of innovation and imitation costs on GDP per capita measured in PPP and on an
indicator of investment risk. An appropriate choice of two adjustment parameters of the
model gives a possibility to generate trajectories of more than 80 countries and, for most
of them, get qualitatively correct pictures of their movement. It turns out that three
groups of countries behave differently, and there is a tendency to converge inside each
group. Increase in institutional quality get countries out of underdevelopment traps, from
the imitation area to a better steady state where local innovations and imitations are
jointly used. All countries with high quality of institutions are moving toward the area
where pure innovation policy prevails.
1 Introduction
A complicated picture of relative productivity growth in different countries is one of the
main challenges for the economic science. European countries seem to be converging
whereas most of developing economies keep their relative distance from the leaders un-
changed or even fall behind. Only few East Asia economies were fortune to catch up, and
several unique countries like China, or Vietnam demonstrates fast growth at the recent
time. This paper aims to explain this picture in the framework of a simple model that
takes into account the interaction between innovation and imitation processes.
Up to the end of eighties, innovation and imitation, two sides of the development
process, were modeled separately. Segerstrom (1991) cites the only exception: a paper
by Baldwin and Childs (1969) where firms can choose between innovating and imitating.
Iwai (1984a,b) considered distributions of firms in an industry with respect to efficiency
and suggested a model that describes evolution of the distribution curves. The model
demonstrates a “dynamic equilibrium” between innovation and imitation processes. This
approach, in principle, may be implemented to country distributions as well. It is devel-
oped in a number of papers by Henkin and Polterovich (see Polterovich, Henkin (1988)
and Henkin, Polterovich (1999) for a survey). They assume that a firm moves to the
neighboring efficiency level due to innovation and imitation of more advanced technolo-
gies, and the speed of the movement depends on the share of more advanced firms. The
movement is described by a difference-differential equation that may be considered as an
analogue of the famous Burgers partial differential equation. It is shown that innovation-
imitation forces may split an isolated industry into several groups so that the solution
looks like a combination of several isolated waves moving with different speeds.
Segerstrom (1991) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model and studies its steady
state in which some firms devote resources to discovering new products and other firms
copy them. Somewhat similar model is suggested in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995)
to describe the interaction between innovation and imitation as an engine of economic
growth. They show that follower countries tend to catch up to the leader because imitation
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is cheaper than innovation. Barro and Sala-I-Martin discuss also a number of related issues
and papers devoted to technological diffusion, R&D races and leapfrogging. The theory
of leapfrogging is developed in Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993).
In a recent paper by Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002), it is shown that countries
at early stages of development use imitation strategy whereas more advanced economies
switch to innovation-based policy. Relatively backward economies may switch out of
investment-based strategy too soon or fail to switch at all. In the last case, they get
into a non-convergence trap. The traps are more likely if the domestic credit market is
imperfect. The authors receive also a number of other results that characterize policies
for different stages of development.
Our model borrows a number of elements from Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002).
We concentrate on the innovation-imitation tradeoff and develop this part of their model.
Our approach is different from approaches used by other authors in several important
aspects.
1. We do not assume, as it is done in other papers, that a country always imitates
the most advanced technology. This assumption seems to be too strict. Every de-
veloping country experiences a lot of failures connected with attempts of borrowing
the most recent achievements of the developed world. It is too often that modern
techniques and technologies turn out to be incompatible with domestic culture, in-
stitutions, quality of human capital, or domestic technological structure. A rational
policy admits borrowing of the past experience of the leaders. Imitation of a less
advanced technology is cheaper and has more chances for a success.
2. We make difference between global and local innovations. The first ones may be
borrowed by other countries whereas the second ones are country specific. It is quite
plausible that the most part of R&D expenditures are spent for local innovations1.
1In Pack (2001, p.114) the following passage from Ruttan (1997) is cited: “The technologies that are
capable of becoming the most productive sources of growth are often location specific”. Pack writes that
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If one likes to use R&D expenditures as a measure for the innovation activity, one
should not assume that all innovations produced are useful for other countries2.
3. The larger is an innovation or an imitation, the less is the probability to produce
it. Therefore, both policies exhibit decreasing rate of return. The tradeoff between
innovation and imitation projects may result in producing both of them in positive
proportions.
4. Costs of imitation and innovation in a country depend on its relative level of devel-
opment. The level of development is defined as a ratio of the country productivity
parameter to the productivity of the most advanced economy. A similar assumption
is used in Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002), where the costs per unit of the
productivity increase are taken to be constant for imitation and linear for innova-
tion. We consider quite general shape of cost functions. It is assumed, however, that
the value of imitation cost function increases and the value of innovation cost func-
tion decreases when the economy approaches a leader. A similar assumption about
the cost of imitation may be found in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995). The reason is
that less advanced economies may borrow well-known and cheap technologies that
may be even obsolete for advanced economies.
The shape of dependence of unit innovation cost on development levels is more
questionable. On the one hand, one could assume decreasing rate of return, on
the other hand, accelerating effects of the technical progress occur. We analyze
empirical data to demonstrate that unit innovation cost is probably less for most
advanced economies.
5. We take into account the country’s institutional quality that affects imitation and
innovation cost functions. Since the institutional indicators are considered as ex-
“this view is widely shared among those who have done considerable research on the microeconomics of
technology. . . ”.
2In Russia in 2001, R&D expenditures amounted to 100.5 billion rubles, whereas the value of exported
technologies was only 19 billion rubles. (Russian Statistical year book, 2002. M.: Goskomstat, pp. 521–
522). There were granted more than 16000 patents, and only 4 of those were exported.
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ogenous, we study the behavior of the economy for a broad class of expenditures
functions.
6. In most of investigations, steady states are studied only. However, to generate a
picture that would resemble a real set of country trajectories, one has to consider
transition paths. To do that, we are forced to simplify our model drastically. The
model is quasi-static and generates trajectories as sequences of static equilibria3.
We do not consider capital accumulation at all4 and make use of many other sim-
plifications as well.
It will be shown that in the simple model suggested below, there are three types of
stationary states, where only imitation, only innovation or a mixed policy prevails. It is
demonstrated how one can find the stationary states and check their stability for a broad
class of imitation-innovation cost functions.
Using World Bank statistical data for the period of 1980-1999, we reveal dependence
of innovation and imitation cost on GDP per capita measured in PPP and on indicator of
investment risk. An appropriate choice of two adjustment parameters of the model gives
a possibility to generate trajectories of more than 80 countries and, for most of them,
get quantitatively correct pictures of their movement. Roughly speaking, three groups of
countries behave differently. There is a tendency to converge within each group. Countries
with low institutional quality have stable underdevelopment traps near the imitation area.
Increase in the quality moves the steady state toward a better position and turns into a
new stable steady state where local innovations and imitations are jointly used. Under
further institutional improvements, a combined imitation-innovation underdevelopment
trap disappears. All countries with high quality of institutions are moving toward the
area where pure innovation policy prevails.
3This is a feature of the Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti’s model as well.
4Many authors, who study endogenous growth models, use this simplification (see Aghion and
Howitt, 1998, or Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995).
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2 Description of the model
In this section, a simple model of imitation and innovation is introduced to explain the
dynamics of relative productivity growth in different countries.
The basics of the model are the same as in Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002a).
We consider a multi-product economy evolving over time. Every period, final output y
is produced from labor l and the continuum set of intermediate inputs xν (ν ∈ [0, 1]).
Given Aν , the productivity level achieved in sector ν, the final output is given by the
following production function:
y =
1
α
1∫
0
(Aνl)
1−αxαν dν. (1)
The output sector is competitive; it is assumed that the world price of output is 1 and the
price of xν is pν . Then the inverse demand function for good xν is given by the marginal
product of xν in (1):
pν =
(
Aνl
xν
)1−α
, (2)
where α ∈ (0, 1).
There are many firms in each sector ν but only one of them enjoys the full access to the
most recent technology of producing xν : this leader firm can produce one unit of xν from
one unit of output, whereas its rivals have to spend χ units of output for the same task
(1 < χ < 1/α). Therefore, they fail to compete with the leader firm and produce nothing
in equilibrium. However, the existence of the competitive fringe affects the price policy of
the leader firm: the monopoly price 1/α is not feasible and the leader has to set pν = χ.
Thus, χ reflects the strength of monopoly power in high-technology industries.
In each sector ν, the leader firm lives for one period of time (unlike Acemoglu, Aghion,
and Zilibotti (2002a), where firms live for two periods and form overlapping generations).
Each leader firm starts with the average productivity level A. This level represents the
cumulative knowledge achieved by the economy at the end of the previous period. In
the beginning of the current period, the firm performs technological innovations and
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imitations, thus raising its productivity from A to Aν , and then produces intermediate
input at productivity level Aν (it will be described later on, how this level is obtained).
The labor supply in the economy is assumed to be inelastic and equal to L. The profit
of the leader firm piν is then given by
piν = δLAν ; (3)
where
δ = (χ−1)χ− 11−α — increasing in χ.
A+1 is the average level of technology in the economy achieved at the end of the current
period. We assume that next-period firms start their development from this productiv-
ity level, so A+1 plays the same role for them as A for current-period firms. Thereby,
the spillover effect is exhibited: each firm slightly affects the productivity of its succes-
sors when developing its own technology or imitating foreign one, though this positive
externality is not captured by the firm’s profit.
The above considerations concern the domestic economy. There are also foreign coun-
tries with different productivity levels. Denote by A¯, the (average) productivity level of
the most developed economy at the end of the previous period. In addition to the domes-
tic absolute productivity level A, let us consider the relative level a =
A
A¯
which measures
the distance to the world technology frontier. It represents the position of the domestic
technology among other ones.
Now let us describe the evolution of technologies. As we said, each firm performs
imitation and/or innovation prior to production. Let b1 and b2 denote, respectively,
the size of the imitation and innovation project. Each project may result in one of
two outcomes, success or failure. If the imitation (innovation) was successful, firm’s
productivity rises at growth rate b1 (b2); otherwise, it remains the same. Thus, after both
actions, the technology variable A(ν) is given by
Aν = (1+ξ1(ν))(1+ξ2(ν))A, (4)
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where ξ1(ν) (ξ2(ν)) is a random variable equal to b1 (b2) in the case of successful imitation
(innovation) by firm ν and 0 otherwise. Firms cannot imitate technologies which have not
been developed anywhere in the world yet, so the size of the imitation project is subject
to constraint
(1+ b1) ≤
1
a
, (5)
where a =
A
A¯
. The maximal productivity level A¯ is generated by the leader economy and
is not affected by innovations made by less advanced economies. Thus, we assume that
the followers produce local innovations which are country-specific and cannot be imitated.
We assume that the probabilities of success are, respectively, ψ1(b1) and ψ2(b2), where
ψ1(b1) =
µ1
µ1 + b1
;
ψ2(b2) =
µ2
µ2 + b2
.
The postulated form of the probability function is the simplest one that satisfies natural
boundary conditions: ψ(0) = 1, ψ(∞) = 0. It will be shown below that µ1 and µ2 are
maximal possible growth rates due to imitation and innovation, respectively.
The costs of imitation and innovation are assumed to be linear in bi. Under the above
assumptions, the expected profit of the firm is given by
E(piν) = δLA+1−c1b1−c2b2, (6)
where
A+1 = (1+ψ1(b1)b1)(1+ψ2(b2)b2)A (7)
is just the next-period productivity level equal to the expectation of Aν (note that de-
spite all Aν are stochastic, their average A+1 is non-random because the set of sectors is
continual).
Per-unit costs c1 and c2 are assumed to depend on the absolute and relative average
productivity level of our economy at the end of the previous period. Particularly, ci are
given by
ci = δLAqi(a), (8)
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where q1(a) is increasing and q2(a) is decreasing in a (moreover, both functions are as-
sumed to be continuous in a). Thus, it gets more difficult to imitate and easier to innovate,
as the domestic technology gets closer to the world technology frontier. These assumptions
were discussed above and will be supported below by the empirical analysis.
Let us denote q¯1 = q1(1), q¯2 = q2(1). From now on, assume that q¯2 < 1. This assump-
tion is needed to exclude the cases where no innovation is performed by any economy (see
Figure 1 on page 13).
Thus, both forms of technological development are modeled in a similar way here.
However, the opportunities for imitation and innovation change in different ways as a
increases. In particular, when a is close to 1, there is almost nothing to imitate, whereas
innovation is possible and its cost is low.
To summarize, the technology evolves as follows. At the beginning of the period, all
leader firms start from the same productivity level A. Firms choose the sizes of their
imitation and innovation projects which maximize their profits. Then random events
are realized: success or failure of these projects (correspondingly, random variables Aν
are evaluated). Then production takes place and profits are earned. The next-period
productivity level A+1 is the integral of Aν over all ν ∈ [0, 1]. All next-period firms
start their projects from this level. They make their innovations and imitations, leaving
productivity level A+2 to their successors, and so on.
3 Analysis of the model
In this section, imitation and innovation strategies in each country are obtained and the
dynamics or relative growth is studied based on the model described above.
It is convenient for the further study to introduce alternative variables for imitation
and innovation strategies. Let us denote yi = ψi(bi)bi and use yi as independent variables
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instead of bi. Then
bi =
µiyi
µi − yi
. (9)
Since any technology can be imitated only if it has been developed somewhere in the
world (see (5)), y1 is bounded from above:
y1 ≤ y¯1(a) =
1
a
1− a +
1
µ1
(10)
Substituting (8) and (9) into (6), we can rewrite the optimization problem of the firm as
(1+y1)(1+y2)−
µ1
µ1 − y1
q1(a)y1−
µ2
µ2 − y2
q2(a)y2 → max
y1,y2
(11)
subject to
y1 ∈ [0, y¯1(a)]; y2 ∈ [0, µ2). (12)
If the technology imitated in the optimum is not the most advanced one (y1 < y¯1(a)),
then the first-order conditions are
y1 = yˆ1(y2) = max
(
µ1
(
1−
√
q1
1 + y2
)
, 0
)
;
y2 = yˆ2(y1) = max
(
µ2
(
1−
√
q2
1 + y1
)
, 0
)
,
(13)
where q1 = q1(a), q2 = q2(a). Let (y1, y2) be the solution to (13). The first-order conditions
yield the actual maximum of profits, if the following second-order condition hold:
(µ1−y1)(µ2−y2) < 4(1+y1)(1+y2). (14)
In particular, it is sufficient for (14) to be valid that
µ1µ2 < 4. (15)
From now on, let us assume that (15) always holds.
Now let us determine y1 and y2. To begin with, suppose that constraint (10) is not
binding. Then the the optimal solution (y1, y2) depends only on the position of point
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q = (q1, q2) (see Figure 1 on page 13: areas D00, D0+, D+0 and D++ separated with
dotted lines). It is easy to check that if q1 ≥ 1 and q2 ≥ 1 (q ∈ D00), then y1 = y2 = 0,
i. e. the economy stagnates with no technological development. If q1 ≥ 1 + µ2
(
1−√q2
)
and q2 < 1 (q ∈ D0+), then y1 = 0 and y2 = µ2
(
1−√q2
)
, i. e. there are only innovations.
If q2 ≥ 1 + µ1
(
1−√q1
)
and q1 < 1 (q ∈ D+0), then y1 = µ1
(
1−√q1
)
and y2 = 0, i. e.
there are only imitations. Otherwise (if q ∈ D++), the optimum is interior (0 < y1 <
y¯1(a), 0 < y2 < µ2). In this case, the analysis of equation (13) yields that yi negatively
depends on both q1 and q2. Thus, some kind of complementary effect takes place: if the
per-unit cost of innovation gets down, then the imitation activity will rise even though
the per-unit cost of imitation remains the same; an analogous effect for innovations is
present too5.
All of the above is true for any a only if constraint (10) is never binding, i. e. if
yˆ1(yˆ2(y¯1(a))) < y¯1(a) (16)
for any a. If a = 0, then (16) holds automatically. If a = 1, then y¯1(a) = 0, so (10) is not
binding, when
q¯1 ≥ 1+µ2
(
1−√q¯2
)
. (17)
In fact, (17) just means that q¯ = (q¯1, q¯2) ∈ D0+ (see Figure 1). As follows from the above
considerations, if (17) does not hold, then there must exist a¯ ∈ [0, 1], such that (16) holds
for a < a¯ and does not hold for a ≥ a¯ for all a sufficiently close to a¯. This a¯ can be
determined from the following equation:
yˆ1(yˆ2(y¯1(a))) = y¯1(a). (18)
Is it true that the solution to (18) does not exist, when (17) holds, and is unique, otherwise?
Generally, one cannot be sure about this, however, it is a typical situation. In particular,
it can be shown that the above statement is true for low µ1 and µ2 (for example, this is
the case, when the firm’s time horizon is short, say, one year).
5These effects are subtle, if µ1 and µ2 are low.
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If (17) does not hold (q¯ ∈ D++), then constraint (10) is binding for sufficiently high a.
In this case, y1 = y¯1(a) and y2 = yˆ2(y¯1(a)), i. e. the most advanced technology is imitated.
It is convenient in this case to consider instead of q1(·), the “adjusted” per-unit cost
function
q˜1(a) =

 q1(a), if (16) holds;solution to yˆ1(yˆ2(y¯1(a))) = y¯1(a) with respect to q1, otherwise,
(19)
where q1 is treated as an independent variable in the lower equation. Obviously, if (16)
does not hold, then q˜1(a) ≥ q1(a). In this case, the adjusted per-unit cost q˜1(a) is given
by
q˜1(a) = µ
2
1a
2
1 + µ2max
(
1−
√
1− a+ µ1a
1− a+ µ1
q2(a), 0
)
(1− a + µ1a)2
. (20)
In particular, if (17) does not hold, then q˜(1) = (q˜1(1), q2(1)) lies at the left boundary
of D0+ (see Figure 1b).
If q(a) is replaced with q˜(a) = (q˜1(a), q2(a)), the solution to the profit maximization
problem remains the same but constraint (17) is now never binding, so the solution is
always determined by the analog of (13).
Now let us study the dynamics of the system. The relationship between the new
productivity level A+1 and the old one A is given by (7). Thus, the absolute productivity
level of any economy is growing over time or, at least, staying the same. However, the
relative productivity level a may fall because some economies may grow slower than the
world technology frontier moves. Suppose that there is no leapfrogging, i. e. the highest
average productivity level in the world at the end of the current period is reached by the
same country as that one period ago6. Then the evolution of a is determined by
a+1(a) =
A+1
A¯+1
=
(1 + y1)(1 + y2)
1 + g¯
a, (21)
where g¯ is the growth rate of the most advanced economy:
g¯ =
A¯+1
A¯
− 1. (22)
6The case of leapfrogging will be considered later on, see page 16
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The most advanced economy is unable to imitate technologies, it can only innovate, so
y1 = 0 in this economy. Hence,
g¯ = yˆ2(0) = µ2
(
1−√q¯2
)
. (23)
The evolution equation (21) can be treated as an autonomous difference equation:
its right-hand side does not depend neither on time, nor on individual characteristics
of countries other than the phase variable a. Hence, in order to predict the process of
evolution and the eventual state of the system, one just has to know, for which a the
difference a+1(a)− a is positive and for which a it is negative.
Let us define the cost curve within plain (q1, q2) as the set of pairs (q˜1(a), q2(a)) for
a ∈ [0, 1]. Denote ϕ(q1) = q2(q˜−11 (q1)). Then the cost curve is fully determined by ϕ(·)
and the edge values q˜1(0), q˜1(1): it consists of pairs (q1, ϕ(q1)), where q1 ∈ [q˜1(0), q˜1(1)].
Suppose that q¯2 = ϕ(q˜1(1)) is given. Let us define the steady-state curve as the set of
potential steady-state pairs (q1, q2), i. e. pairs for which a+1(a) = a, where a = q˜
−1
1 (q1)
(due to (21) and (23), this definition is correct).
Within D0+, the steady-state curve is a horizontal line with q2 = q¯2. So, if a < 1 and
q˜(a) ∈ D0+ (this may be the case for relatively high a and only when (17) holds), then
there is no imitation the distance to frontier will definitely increase (see Figure 1a).
Within D+0, the steady-state curve is a vertical line with q1 = q˘1, where
q˘1 =
(
1− µ2
µ1
(
1−√q¯2
))2
, (24)
so the direction of the evolution depends only on the cost of imitation in this case.
Within D++, the steady-state curve is determined by the following equation:
(1+y1)(1+y2) = 1+ g¯, (25)
where pair (y1, y2) can be found from (13), with q˜1 in place of q1, and g¯ is given by (22).
Since both y1 and y2 are decreasing in q1 and q2, equation (25) determines a downward-
sloping curve in plain (q1, q2).
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q˜1
q2
D+0
D00
D0+
D++
a+1 < a
a+1 > a
(catching up)
a+1 > a a+1 < a
a = 0
q˜(a)
a = 1×
•Q`
Q`
a) Constraint (10) is never binding.
0
1
1
q˜1
q2
D+0 D00
D0+
D++
a+1 < a
a+1 > a
(catching up)
a = 0
a = 1a = a¯
q˜(a) •
+
•
JEE
a
D++: y1 > 0, y2 > 0
D+0: y1 > 0, y2 = 0
D0+: y1 = 0, y2 > 0
D00: y1 = 0, y2 = 0
• stable stationary point
× unstable stationary point
b) Constraint (10) is binding for some a.
0
1
1
Figure 1: Cost curve q˜ (a), catching-up area and steady states.
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The entire steady-state curve is depicted in Figure 1a,b. The position of this curve
depends only on q¯2 and does not depend on the position of the rest of the cost curve.
Now, to qualitatively analyze the dynamics, it is sufficient to know, how the cost curve
is positioned about the steady-state curve. The relative productivity level of the economy
rises after the period if and only if point q(a) lies below and/or to the left from the
steady-state curve (let us call the corresponding zone “catching-up area”). Steady states
correspond to intersection points of the cost curve with the steady-state curve. If ϕ(q1)
gets out of the catching-up area as q1 goes up (in other words, the slope of the cost curve
is flatter that the slope of the steady-state curve), then the corresponding stationary point
is stable; otherwise, it is unstable. For example, in Figure 1a, there is one stable steady
state with a < 1 and one unstable7, with a = 1. In Figure 1b, there are two steady states,
with a = 1 and with low a; there is also an unstable state with intermediate a which is a
boundary between the zones of attraction of the stable states.
In particular, an important question is whether the close pursuers of the leader econ-
omy will get even closer to the technology frontier or the leader will gradually move away
from them. Obviously, a+1(1) = 1 in the case of no leapfrogging, so the pursuers will
reduce the gap if and only if
da+1
da
∣∣∣∣
a=1
< 1. (26)
It is clear that some imitation activity is needed to reduce the gap, so condition (26) will
definitely not hold if y1 = 0 for a close to 1, i. e. if (17) holds as a strict inequality (see
Figure 1b). Otherwise, y1 = y¯1(a) and y2 = yˆ2(y¯1(a)) in a close neighborhood of 1, so
the left-hand side of (26) can be easily calculated using (10) and (13). We obtain the
following condition:
e¯2 < 2
1 + 1/µ2√
q¯2
−1, (27)
7The number of stationary points in dynamic systems is usually odd. Here the number is even because
one of the points lies at the boundary of the phase space, which is [0, 1]. This point may be treated as
two coincident stationary points, one stable and one unstable.
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where e¯2 is the elasticity of innovation cost in a around the leader:
e¯2 = −
q′2(1)
q¯2
.
In particular, (27) holds for sure, if e¯2 < 1. The intuitive sense of condition (27) is clear:
if the innovation efficiency gap between the leader and its pursuers is not very wide, then
the pursuers have a chance to catch up the leader combining innovation and imitation
activity (though it is easier for the leader to innovate, it cannot imitate at all).
All of the above is true only if the relative productivity level a is the only parameter
in which countries may vary. However, the growth opportunities of countries actually
depend on many other factors. For example, suppose that cost qi depends on the level
of institutional development I: qi = qi(a, I). In this case, our dynamical system is not
autonomous and countries may overtake and surpass each other due to differences in I.
However, the principles of our analysis are applicable for this more general case as well: as
far as the leader country remains the same, the position of the steady-state curve does not
changes, so all what we need is to draw cost curves for the values of I we are interested in
and look at points where they intersect the steady-state curve (see Figure 2). Of course,
analysis gets much more complicated in the presence of institutional changes, especially
when they are endogenous to some extent.
Now let us study how innovation and imitation activities depend on the relative pro-
ductivity level. Since imitation becomes more difficult and innovation easier as a increases,
it seems that y1 is likely to fall and y2 is likely to rise as a gets higher. However, this
is only a trend, not a precise fact. Moreover, the above-mentioned complementary effect
may bring about some ambiguity: for example, a rises ⇒ y1 falls ⇒ y2 must somewhat
fall too.
Implicit differentiation of (13) yields that the direction of the effect of an increase
in a depends on e21, the elasticity of substitution between imitation and innovation (or,
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geometrically, on the slope of the cost curve plotted in the log scale):
∂y1
∂a
> 0, iff e21 >
2(1 + y2)
µ2 − y2
;
∂y2
∂a
> 0, iff e21 >
µ1 − y1
2(1 + y1)
,
(28)
where
e21 = −
q˜1(a)q
′
2(a)
q2(a)q˜′1(a)
= −ϕ′(q˜1)
q˜1(a)
q2(a)
.
One can see from (28) that the higher e21, the more probable a positive impact of an
increase in a on innovation and imitation activities. This is not surprising: the steeper
the slope of the cost curve is, the closer point q(a) gets to the origin which means that both
forms of technological development are likely to be enhanced. The “intuitively expected”
outcome (more innovation, less imitation) takes place only for intermediate levels of e21:
µ1 − y1
2(1 + y1)
< e21 <
2(1 + y2)
µ2 − y2
(29)
(as follows from (15), the left-hand side of (29) is always less than the right-hand side).
A simple sufficient condition for (29) is
µ1
2
< e21 <
2
µ2
(30)
Now let us turn to the issue of leapfrogging. All of the above is true only when
the right-hand side of (21) does not exceed 1 for all countries involved in the model,
otherwise the leading position will be occupied by different countries in different periods
(which is called “leapfrogging”). If we consider only close pursuers of the current leader
as reasonable candidates for a new leader8, then it is necessary for leapfrogging to be
possible that
∂anlf+1
∂a
∣∣∣∣∣
a=1
< 0, (31)
where anlf+1 is just a+1 under no leapfrogging (see the right-hand side of (21)). Condi-
tion (31) is equivalent to the following inequality:
e¯2 <
2√
q¯2
− 1. (32)
8Of course, one could construct an example of leapfrogging in which close pursuers cannot surpass the
leader. However, this situation seems to be too exotic.
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In particular, if e¯2 < 1, then leapfrogging is definitely possible. Leapfrogging will actually
take place if some countries have their a sufficiently close to 1.
Sequential change of one leader with another may be generally a very complicated,
even chaotic process. To illustrate the essence of leapfrogging, consider a process in which
two countries, S and T each time replace one another at the leadership position: initially,
country S has aS = 1 and T has aT = a¯ < 1; then they change their roles: aT = 1, aS = a¯,
and so on. This process is stationary if
anlf+1 (a¯) =
1
a¯
. (33)
The growth rate of the world technology frontier is now given by
g¯ =
1 + µ2 (1−
√
q¯2)
a¯
−1.
Thus, the frontier moves faster than in the case of no leapfrogging. This results in shifting
the steady-state curve down and to the left, comparing to Figure (1b). Thus, while the
two leaders help each other grow faster, the other countries have less opportunities for
approaching the frontier. In particular, all stable steady states get lower and all unstable
ones get higher (so, traps get wider).
4 Empirical adjustment of the model
In this section, some empirical considerations will be given about the model considered
above. The model is far from being universal, it takes into account only a few factors.
So, we do not intend to precisely test the model. All we are going to do is to choose its
parameters so as to adjust it to the existing data.
The source of the data is the World Development Report (2001). The structure of the
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data is the following:
Yt − GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) in year 1900 + t,
t = 80, . . . , 99, 87 countries;
I − quality of institutions (aggregate index of investment risks, 2000–2001),
Iis higher for lower risks; 87 countries;
C1 − spending on imitation activity (net royalty payments, % of GDP),
average over 1980–1999, 27 countries;
C2 − spending on innovation activity (R&D), % of GDP,
average over 1980–1999, 27 countries.
Based on these data, we construct other variables useful for our analysis:
at =
Yt
Yt[USA]
− proxy for relative productivity level (for each country);
aav = (a80 . . . a99)
1/20 − geometrical average over all at (for each country);
g =
(
Y99
Y80
)1/19
− 1 − average growth rate of GDP (for each country);
ga =
(
a99
a80
)1/19
− 1 − average growth rate of at (for each country).
We introduce at in such a way because USA have been a permanent leader in Yt for all
the period 1980–1999 (except for a few fluctuations).
The main difficulty in our analysis is that we do not know the values of q1 and q2
and observe C1 and C2 instead. Thus, we need a method to calculate q1 and q2. Our
approach is the following: we assume that expenditures Ci are proportional to
µi
µi − yi
qiyi
and based on this assumption, construct proxies for y1 and y2, the shares of imitation and
innovation in the total growth rate g. Provided that y1 and y2 are positive, q1 and q2 can
be easily obtained due to the first-order conditions (13):
q1 =
(µ1 − y1)2(1 + y2)
µ21
;
q2 =
(µ2 − y2)2(1 + y1)
µ22
.
(34)
Let us denote
γ =
µ2C2
µ1C1
.
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Using (34), one can obtain:
γ =
(µ2 − y2)(1 + y1)y2
(µ1 − y1)(1 + y2)y1
(35)
Since all values of g in the sample are small (actually, lower than 0.12), one can expect
(see formula (7)) that y1 and y2 are small too. So, in order to simplify calculations, let us
linearize the model within a neighborhood of (y1, y2) = (0, 0) (the error occurring due to
this simplification is expected to have a very small share in the total estimation error). In
particular, multipliers (1+yi) in (35) can be neglected
9. Thus, (35) can be approximately
rewritten as
γ =
(µ2 − y2)y2
(µ1 − y1)y1
, (36)
where y1 and y2 are tied with an approximate equality
y1+ y2 = g. (37)
Let us set µ1 and µ2 at some level. Solving (36)–(37) for (y1, y2) and adopting con-
straints (12), we obtain the following proxies for y1 and y2:
y1 = max (min (y˜1, y¯1(a
av)) , 0) ;
y2 = g − y1,
(38)
where
y˜1 =
γµ1 + µ2 − 2g −
√
(γµ1 + µ2)2 − 4γg(µ1 + µ2 − g)
2(γ − 1) (39)
(it turns out that γ > 1 for each country from the sample, if µ1 is not much higher
than µ2).
As far as y1 and y2 are calculated, q1 and q2 can be obtained from (34).
Our next task is to estimate q1 and q2 as functions of a and institution variable I,
taking µ1 and µ2 as given. We have chosen the linear representation for the cost functions:
q1(a, I) = βa1a+ βI1I + β1;
q2(a, I) = βa2a+ βI2I + β2,
(40)
9Note that yi in (µi − yi) cannot be neglected because µi, the maximal possible growth rate, may be
small as well as yi.
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For a given pair (µ1, µ2), parameters of functions (40) can be estimated using OLS (with
aav staying for a in the regressions). Thus, we have all parameters of the model.
Now we can study the evolution of the model world and compare it to that of the real
world.
As before, let us deal with the linearized model. The first-order conditions (13) can
be approximately rewritten for small y1 and y2 as
y1 = min
(
max
(
µ1
(
1−
√
q1(a, I)
)
+
µ1y2
√
q1
2
, 0
)
, y¯1(a)
)
;
y2 = max
(
µ2
(
1−
√
q2(a, I)
)
+
µ2y1
√
q2
2
, 0
)
.
(41)
Here constraints (12) are taken into account. System (41) can be easily solved for (y1, y2),
so we obtain functions yˇ1(a, I) and yˇ2(a, I) (these are the predicted values of the imitation
and innovation growth rates; they do not coincide with our proxies for y1 and y2). Now
one can easily construct a recurrent formula for a+1 as a function of a and I:
a+1(a, I) = (1+yˇ1(a, I)+yˇ2(a, I)−yˇ2(1, I[USA]))a (42)
(formula (42) is just the linearization for (21)). Equation (42) determines the evolution
of the model. In order to check, whether the model is consistent with the reality, let us
try to predict the relative productivity level of countries in 1999, given that in 1980:
aˇ99 = a+1(a+1(. . . a+1(a80, I) . . . , I), I) (19 times)
Now we can choose µ1 and µ2 so as to achieve the best prediction. But how to measure
the quality of prediction? There are several reasonable criteria. Let us list some of them,
with the optimal µ1 and µ2 (according to the corresponding criterion) in parentheses.
Minimal sum of squares (µ1 = 0.073, µ2 = 0.098): the sum of squares of error a99−aˇ99
is minimized. This criterion is sensitive to outliers.
Coincidence of directions (µ1 = 0.081, µ2 = 0.125): the predicted direction of change
in a during the period 1980–1999 must coincide with the actual one for as many
countries as possible. This criterion does not take into account the speed of changes
but it is robust to outliers.
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Figure 2: Cost curves for various institutional levels.
Coincidence of distributions (µ1 = 0.071, µ2 = 0.069): parameters are chosen so that
the density function of distribution of ln aˇ99 be close to that of ln a99 (according to
the least squares criterion). This criterion is useful for dealing with distribution
densities rather than detailed cross-country data.
For example, suppose that µ1 and µ2 are chosen according to the second criterion
(µ1 = 0.081, µ2 = 0.125). Then the estimated cost functions take the form
q1(a, I) = 1.012
(4.46)
a− 0.0206
(−2.32)
I + 1.790
(2.99)
;
q2(a, I) = −0.325
(−1.43)
a− 0.0034
(−0.38)
I + 0.997
(1.66)
(43)
(t-statistics are given below the coefficients, in parentheses). The best quality of the
directional prediction is 83% (the prediction is incorrect for 15 countries out of 86, not
including USA).
For comparison, consider the regressions with I not included:
q1(a, I) = 0.624
(3.75)
a+ 0.413
(4.65)
;
q2(a, I) = −0.325
(−2.57)
a+ 0.997
(9.54)
.
(44)
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Figure 3: Distribution of countries with respect to ln a
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The directional prediction is only 66%.
Note that the signs of coefficients for a in (43) and (44) coincide with those postulated
in the theoretical model. Another conclusion from the regressions is about the importance
of the institutional variable for estimating the cost functions. However, the analysis of
t-statistics shows that I significantly improves the precision of estimation only for the cost
function of imitation, whereas its impact on the cost of innovation is insignificant. One
of possible explanations is that the data we use concern the expenditures on local inno-
vations. Only a small part of these R&D expenditures is materialized in large investment
projects, so this activity does not require good investment climate.
Figure 2 depicts typical cases of positioning the estimated cost curve (43) with respect
to the steady-state curve. If I is low (e. g., if the country has the same institutional index
as Ecuador), then all of the cost curve lies out of the catching-up area, so the country will
gradually fall to the lowest possible productivity level (a = 0). This is a stable stationary
point (trap) and the corresponding (q1, q2) are near to the imitation area D+0.
For intermediate I (e. g., Greece), the zero steady state ceases to be stable and a new
stable steady state occurs with positive a. However, the country cannot catch up the
leader.
If the country has the same quality of institutions as USA, then the picture becomes
similar to Figure 1a: an additional unstable steady state a = 1 occurs.
For a little higher I (e. g., Japan), we would have the cost curve positioned a little
lower than the curve for USA, so three stationary points would occur in this case: two
stable (a = 1 and a < 1) and one unstable between them. If the country starts above the
unstable steady state, then it will eventually catch up the leader; otherwise, it will get to
the trap with a < 1.
Finally, for the highest I (Singapore, Norway), all of the cost curve lies in the catching-
up area, so the country will eventually catch up the leader, no matter where it has started
from.
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The evolution of the distribution of ln a is depicted in Figure 3 (µ1 and µ2 are chosen
so as to better predict the distribution density: µ1 = 0.071, µ2 = 0.069; the direction of
change in a is predicted correctly for 73% countries in this case). One can see that in 1980,
the distribution looks like the normal (unimodal) one, whereas in 1999, it has at least three
local peaks. The above theoretical analysis suggests that these peaks may correspond to
stable fixed points of a+1(a, I) for the most typical levels of I. However, another situation
is possible: two “waves” of countries moving in the opposite directions may approach each
other and “interfere”. In particular, there is a group of intensively growing countries with
relatively high quality of institutions: Norway, Ireland, Japan, Sweden, Finland, Hong
Kong, Singapore. These countries have a real opportunity to approach the leader (USA).
However, within the same peak, there are some other countries with weaker institutions
and decreasing a: Belgium, Austria, France, Italy. They are moving away from the
frontier.
5 Conclusion
The results described above makes plausible that the convergence problem, a central
problem of the economic growth theory, may be better understood in the framework of
an imitation-innovation theory if quality of institutions is taken into account. However,
our model has to be developed to get a richer picture that would be closer to reality.
In a recent empirical study, Polterovich and Popov (2003, Stages of Development and
Economic Growth. Manuscript) find that “imports of technology is unambiguously good
for poor countries, but for middle and high income countries it should be supplemented
with own research and development activity in order to have a positive impact on per-
formance.” On the one hand, this finding supports our model that demonstrates why
innovation and imitation may be complementary. On the other hand, however, there is a
divergence: the most intensive innovators, including USA, imitate a lot. Thus, one has to
take into account that a part of followers’ innovations is not local and may be borrowed.
This part increases when the country level of development gets higher.
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It is quite plausible that the cost of imitation depends not only on the distance to fron-
tier but also on the position of a follower among other countries. This line of generalization
leads us to a class of models that were started to study by Henkin and Polterovich (1999).
Institutional qualities of a number of economies like Canada or Norway are very close
if not better to that of USA. Why does the USA keep its leadership so many years? To
answer this question one may try to take into account capital accumulation, consumption,
trade, foreign direct investment, and labor mobility. Another point is that followers pay
to the leader for the right of imitation.
The role of international assistance is one of the most intrigue questions. It is well
known that high inequality is harmful for growth. One could ask how the total world
wealth might be redistributed to increase growth rates and consumption levels of all
countries. This is an important topic for future research.
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